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coherent account, surely a necessity if they are claimed to all have their 
source in God. Perhaps part of the trouble is that so little is written today 
on what it might mean to call God beautiful. Of course, if something like 
Aquinas’s three criteria for beauty were to be employed, the application to 
God makes good sense, but then the word is seldom now used in this way. 
Even cutting the Gordian knot and switching to an alternative term such as 
the aesthetically pleasing would provide only the superficial appearance of 
a solution, since, given the quite different sources of Tallon’s three catego-
ries, what significance, if any, attaches to the use of the shared term would 
still remain as mysterious as ever, and still more so how it might find its 
ultimate source in God. So one looks forward to a sequel from the author 
to this challenging and fascinating book that will carry forward discussion 
of such questions.
Theology without Metaphysics: God, Language, and the Spirit of Recognition, 
by Kevin W. Hector. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 293 
pages. $75.00 (paperback).
JEFF SNAPPER, University of Notre Dame
In Theology without Metaphysics Kevin Hector endeavors to rid theology of 
metaphysics without giving up true beliefs about God. Why should any-
one want theology to be metaphysics-free? Because of the violence thesis, 
the thesis that metaphysics (and anything that is metaphysical) does vio-
lence to objects by forcing them into categories. Given the violence thesis, 
if theology is metaphysical, it does violence to God. Hector, admirably, 
wants to do theology without doing violence to God. He endorses the 
violence thesis. He concludes (rightly, given his premises) that we should 
rid theology of metaphysics.
The worry, however, is that if we rid theology of metaphysics we are 
going to be left without any true beliefs about God. We want to believe, for 
example, that God is good. But we also want to get rid of any metaphysi-
cal overtones that belief might have. Once those overtones are eliminated, 
the belief may well come out not true. And that price—no true theologi-
cal beliefs—is too high for Hector. So, after filtering the toxic metaphysics 
out of the wholesome theology, we also need a non-toxic account of true 
theological beliefs.
Hector’s book has three main parts. Chapter 1 tries to remove the nasty 
metaphysics from the nourishing theology. Chapters 2–5 try to explain 
how theological beliefs can be true without help from metaphysics; they 
begin with concept use (chapter 2), move through meaning and reference 
(chapters 3–4), and conclude with a novel account of truth (chapter 5). 
Chapter 6 applies Hector’s original account of truth to specific beliefs. 
Here I focus on chapters 1 and 5.
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Because the book is predicated on the truth of the violence thesis, with-
out that thesis the project loses motivation. I think the violence thesis is 
false and so provide some argument against it. I also reply to Hector’s 
argument that the correspondence theory of truth is idolatrous. I end by 
showing that Hector’s novel account of truth, in terms of taking to be true, 
faces serious objections.
This review is critical but not condemnatory. Hector applies a pro-
vocative metaphysical thesis to theological language and draws out 
problematic consequences. He recognizes that the problems are not local 
to theology but instead are perfectly general—residing as they do in very 
prevalent theories about concepts, reference, and truth. He then gives 
original accounts of concept use, meaning, reference, and truth—all in an 
effort to provide a non-metaphysical philosophy of language for theol-
ogy. This sort of creative, rigorous originality is the kind of philosophy 
that begins sub-disciplines. On to the criticism.
Metaphysics Is Not Violent
Hector identifies metaphysics as the thesis that human ideas about a thing 
determine its essence.1 For example, the essence of the Eiffel Tower is deter-
mined by human ideas about it. Hector traces this meaning of (transla-
tions of) “metaphysics” to Heidegger.2
Anyone who does contemporary metaphysics will scratch her head 
upon hearing that this determination thesis just is metaphysics. It is 
certainly a metaphysical thesis. But it contradicts another metaphysical 
thesis, namely, that no human idea about anything determines any es-
sence. And it would be rather strange if a discipline, like metaphysics, 
were identical to a thesis that contradicted another thesis that is part of 
it. It would be rather like if the discipline of economics were identical to 
classical liberalism or if biology were identical to the Lamarkian theory 
of evolution. Sensing this, Hector grants that the determination thesis 
may just be a particular brand of metaphysics, which he calls essentialist-
correspondentist metaphysics (9). The thesis is essentialist because it is a 
thesis about what determines essences. It is correspondentist because, the 
thought goes, if an essence is determined by an idea then it corresponds 
to that idea.
The violence thesis is not about metaphysics. It is about essentialist-
correspondentist metaphysics (“EC Metaphysics” for short). And the rest 
1In formulating this thesis, Hector sometimes writes as if metaphysics is the thesis that 
the essence of a thing is identical to human ideas about it, and other times as if human ideas 
determine essences. In personal correspondence he clarified that it is the determination thesis, 
not the identity thesis, that is metaphysics.
2Hector writes “Simply stated, then, Heidegger understands metaphysics as the attempt 
to secure human knowledge by identifying the fundamental reality of objects—their being as 
such—with our ideas about them” (9); “what sets the latter [metaphysics] apart is precisely 
an understanding of the being of beings—their essence—as that which must correspond to 
the ideas of a human knower” (9).
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of the project uses EC metaphysics as its target. So a more accurate title 
would have been Theology without Essentialist-Correspondentist Metaphysics.
Hector articulates the violence thesis in a few different ways.3 Let the 
following be a canonical statement of it:
The Violence Thesis: EC metaphysics (and anything that is EC-meta-
physical) does violence to objects by forcing them into categories.
Is The Violence Thesis true? Does the thesis that human idea(s) about a thing 
determine its essence do violence to objects by forcing them into categories?
It is hard to tell. It is hard to tell because it is hard to tell what Hector 
means by “into” and by “forcing.” Typically, “into” expresses a spatial 
relationship—a relationship that holds only between spatially located 
things. I can put the spoon into the ice cream because the spoon and the 
ice cream are both located in space. I cannot put the spoon into the num-
ber two. Suppose “into” expresses a spatial relationship in The Violence 
Thesis. Suppose categories are not located in space—e.g., redness is a Pla-
tonic abstract category. If so, then The Violence Thesis is false because 
nothing (EC metaphysics included) can force an object, like an apple, 
into something (e.g., redness) that is not located in space. Suppose instead 
that categories are located in space; e.g., suppose categories are human 
brain states. If so, then, once again, The Violence Thesis is false because 
EC metaphysics does not force things into human brains (if it did it surely 
would be violent; thankfully, it does not).
This suggests that “into” should be understood metaphorically, as ex-
pressing the falls under relation. We should exchange the The Violence 
Thesis for
The Violence Thesis*: EC metaphysics (and anything that is EC meta-
physical) does violence to objects by forcing them to fall under certain 
categories.
Is the Violence Thesis* true? Does the thesis that human idea(s) about a 
thing determine its essence do violence to objects by forcing them to fall 
under certain categories?
I can force a piece of metal to expand by heating it. Does any thesis—
any declarative sentence or proposition—force anything to fall under cer-
tain categories? Consider the thesis that all humans are mammals. Does 
it force humans to fall under the category of mammalhood? Maybe, but 
I cannot tell whether Hector agrees. The thesis that all humans are mam-
mals does entail that all humans fall under the category of mammalhood.4 
3Here are two representative statements: “metaphysics does violence to objects by forc-
ing them into predetermined categories” (10) and “Insofar as [essentialist-correspondentist] 
metaphysics identifies an object’s essence with one’s ideas about it, it may force the object to 
fit into one’s preconceptions, and this conceptual violence may give comfort, in turn, to other 
sorts of violence” (12).
4Assuming that necessarily, if all Fs are Gs, then all Fs fall under the category of G-hood.
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So if all Hector means by “force” is entailment then it is (obviously) true 
that some theses force things to fall under certain categories.5
On the entailment reading of “force,” I see no violence. On the entail-
ment reading, for a thesis to force something into a category is just for it to 
entail that it is in that category. I fail to see how the thesis that all humans 
are mammals does violence, in any sense of the word “violence,” to hu-
mans. Since the entailment reading is the best one I can give to “force,” I 
think The Violence Thesis* is false.
Still, to see why someone might think that The Violence Thesis* is true, 
consider Hector’s example of violence:
We see this sort of violence [resulting from EC metaphysics] at its most 
graphic when human persons are its object—when, for instance, a woman or 
person of color is allowed to “show up” only insofar as he or she fits within 
one’s prior conception of femininity, blackness, and so on, and when his or 
her attempts to transcend these conceptual boundaries are met with implicit 
or explicit resistance. (11)
The violence at issue is one of categorization. According to Hector, we do 
violence to persons that fall into a category (e.g., womanhood) when we 
affirm that anything that falls into it has certain essential properties. For 
example, Will the weirdo thinks it is essential to women that they are at 
least six feet tall. The idea is that Will, by having that belief, does violence 
to women because persons under six feet tall do not, according to Will’s 
metaphysics, fall under the category of womanhood. And excluding per-
sons from certain categories is violent.
Using that example, here is an initially plausible argument for The Vio-
lence Thesis*. Suppose that EC metaphysics is true—that human ideas 
determine the essences of objects. For example, suppose Will’s idea about 
women determine that it is essential to women that they are at least six 
feet tall. Then Will’s ideas, plus EC metaphysics, does violence to objects 
(namely, women) by forcing people under six feet tall to fall outside the 
category of womanhood. That is, Will’s idea that all women are at least 
six feet tall plus the thesis that human ideas determine essences together 
entail that persons under six feet tall are not women. By entailing that lots 
of persons who surely are women are not, EC metaphysics does violence 
to women. Therefore . . . The Violence Thesis* is true?
That argument is baldly invalid. At most what follows is that EC meta-
physics and Will’s weird belief about female height together do violence to 
objects.6 If no one had ever had any false or nasty beliefs about women, 
EC metaphysics would not do any violence to anything. The source of 
5If something more sinister than entailment is meant by “force,” I would like to know 
what it is.
6“At most” because we must also add that if some theses T1–Tn together entail that some 
people, who self-classify as Fs, are not Fs, then T1–Tn do violence to those people. This ad-
ditional thesis also looks false to me because, again, I fail to see violence. I see miscategori-
zation or perhaps people self-classifying incorrectly. But I do not see either of those things 
necessitating violence.
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violence is the wholly bizarre belief about female height. EC metaphysics 
(and metaphysics) is completely irrelevant.
One might reply as follows. EC metaphysics is relevant because even if 
no one had ever had any false or nasty beliefs, EC metaphysics would still 
do violence to objects. The culprit is not the falsity or the nastiness of the 
beliefs that are conjoined to EC metaphysics, because any categorization of 
objects (whether true or false, nasty or nice) together with EC metaphysics 
does violence to objects.
This view is obviously false. There are infinitely many trivial catego-
rizations of persons: every person is a person, every person exists, every 
person is self-identical, every person is self-identical or a friendly purple 
dinosaur, every person exists or is a number, etc. This list is infinitely long 
and every categorization on it is a necessary truth. The thesis that every 
person is a person entails that there are no persons who are not persons—
and so it “forces” persons into the category of personhood. But it obviously 
does not do violence to anything.
Suppose you think that these infinitely many trivial truths are, for 
some reason, not really categorizations. Perhaps the idea would be that 
something is a categorization only if it is more substantive than those bare 
logically true categorizations. Still, there are infinitely many such categori-
zations of persons that do no violence: every person is loved by God, every 
person is intrinsically valuable, etc. Add “female” or “black” or whatever 
other modifier to “person” you like (e.g., every female person is intrinsi-
cally valuable) and you get infinitely many non-violent characterizations 
of that kind of person. The Violence Thesis* is false.
Correspondence Is Not Idolatrous
In chapter 5 Hector turns his attention towards a correspondence theory 
of truth and highlights a problem for its application to theological beliefs.
The problem is this: if the truth of a belief . . . just is its correspondence to an 
object’s fundamental reality, and if it is inappropriate to think of our beliefs 
as standing in this sort of relationship to God, then it would appear that our 
beliefs cannot be true of God. (201)
But our beliefs can be true of God. So, the truth of a belief is not “just its 
correspondence to an object’s fundamental reality.” As a result, the cor-
respondence theory of truth must go.
Hector spends the rest of chapter 5 formulating an alternative account 
of truth. But before getting to that alternative account it is worth paus-
ing to examine this argument against the correspondence theory of truth 
more carefully. For if the argument against the correspondence theory of 
truth is not successful, we lack motivation for providing a distinct account 
of truth.
Hector’s intuition against the correspondence theory is that there is 
something inappropriate about taking our beliefs to correspond to facts 
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about God. For if God is transcendent, then it is inappropriately prideful, 
and perhaps even idolatrous, to think that our true beliefs about God cor-
respond to facts about God in just the same way as our true beliefs about 
dogs correspond to facts about dogs.
I understand the concern but find it misguided. God is transcendent. 
I believe that God is good. Suppose that my belief is true just in case it 
corresponds to a fact about God. Then my belief that God is good cor-
responds to a fact about God and God is transcendent. No contradiction. 
Suppose we add that my belief that God is good corresponds to a fact 
about God in just the same way as my true belief that dogs shed corre-
sponds to a fact about dogs. Have I entered idolatrous or inappropriate 
territory? I don’t see how.
A sensible view of God’s transcendence is that God is far more powerful 
than anything else, as morally good as any person could be, is not con-
strained by the laws of nature, is much smarter than we can understand, 
etc. Might it not be the case that God is as morally good as any person could 
be, yet it also be a fact about God that God is good? I don’t see why not. My 
belief that God is good could well correspond to a fact about God—namely, 
the fact that God is good—without “threatening” God’s transcendence or 
being idolatrous in any way. I should not go on to add ridiculous theses 
like “Oh yeah, and all the truths there are about God are ones human 
beings can express. And when I say ‘God is good’ I thereby capture every-
thing there is to say about God’s moral status. Oh yes, and when I say ‘God 
is good’ I mean that God is good in exactly the same way that my running 
shoes are good.”
The thesis that my belief that God is good corresponds to a fact about 
God would, together with those added theses, be presumptuous and per-
haps even idolatrous. But I don’t say any of those things, and neither 
should anyone else (they are, after all, all preposterous). So there is no 
problem saying that my belief that God is good is true and so corresponds 
to a fact about God. Concerns about idolatry enter the picture only when 
additional, rather naive theses are added. The upshot is that concerns 
about idolatry do not successfully motivate rejecting a correspondence 
theory of truth.7
“Taking To Be True” Is Not True
In place of a correspondence theory of truth, Hector proposes an account 
of truth in terms of taking to be true. The point, again, is to explain truth 
while avoiding an idolatrous correspondence theory of truth. His account 
of truth in terms of taking to be true is as follows.
We understand the truth of a belief p in terms of taking p to be true. To 
take p to be true is just to judge that p is true, which is just to judge that 
p gets its subject matter right. To judge that p gets its subject matter right 
7Concerns about idolatry are not the only reasons Hector has for rejecting a correspon-
dence theory of truth; see 202–211 for a discussion of three other problems. 
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is to judge that “it goes on in the same way as precedent beliefs that one 
judges to be correct” (225).8 Simplifying, we understand the truth of p in 
terms of judging that p “goes on in the same way as precedent beliefs that 
one judges to be correct.”
This explanation of true beliefs, coupled with a rejection of anything in 
the neighborhood of a correspondence-like biconditional, is supposed to 
enable us to have true theological beliefs without endorsing an idolatrous 
correspondence theory of truth. An example helps here. I understand 
the truth of my belief that God is good by understanding my taking that 
God is good to be true, which I then understand in terms of my belief that 
God is good going on in the same way as precedent beliefs that I judge to 
be correct.
This explanation of truth in terms of taking to be true suffers from two 
serious defects. First, it is either false or uses “correct” in a technical sense 
that needs to be explained. Suppose it uses “correct” in the ordinary collo-
quial sense to mean true. Then to judge a belief to be correct is just to judge 
it to be true.9 On this supposition, Hector’s account is that we understand 
the truth of p in terms of judging that p “goes on in the same way as prec-
edent beliefs that one judges to be [true].” More succinctly, we understand 
the truth of p in terms of judging that p goes on in the same way as true 
precedents of p.
Consider those true precedents of p. If I already understand their truth 
(without appeal to their precedents) then there is no barrier to also under-
standing the truth of the original belief—that God is good—without appeal 
to any of its true precedents. So if I understand the truth of its true prec-
edents without appeal to their precedents, then I understand the truth of 
that God is good without appeal to its precedents, contradicting Hector’s 
account. Suppose, on the other hand, that I understand the truth of its 
true precedents only by appeal to their true precedents, and so on ad infi-
nitum. In that case, I understand the truth of the initial belief—that God is 
good—only if I make infinitely many judgments. I understand the truth of 
the initial belief. I have not made infinitely many judgments. So Hector’s 
account is, again, false. Either I understand the truth of its true precedents 
only by appeal to their true precedents, or not. Either way, unless Hector 
uses “correct” in a technical sense not broadly equivalent to “true,” his 
account of truth cannot be true. If he is using “correct” in a non-standard 
sense, more explanation is in order.
The second defect is that on Hector’s account there could not have been 
a first true belief.10 Consider Tom and Jerry, a (rather heartless) future 
8See especially 225 and 243.
9There is a literature in the philosophy of language on the correctness of assertions that 
sharply distinguishes correctness from truth. If Hector is using one of these more rarified 
notions of correctness here, it needs to be explained. There is no textual indication that he is. 
So I assume that he is using “correct” here in the normal colloquial sense which is broadly 
equivalent to “true.”
10I owe this fine illustration to Michael Rea.
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couple who volunteers their future child for an anthropological experi-
ment. The experiment is to see how a human child develops when reared 
in a wholly alien setting isolated from other human beings (add whatever 
we need here for the child to actually thrive and grow, since some stud-
ies suggest that without something like social contact humans die). The 
anthropologist contacts Tom and Jerry prior to conception. She tells them 
they cannot speak in the presence even of the zygote. Upon birth, they 
give the child to the anthropologist who seals him (it’s a boy!) in a sound-
proof capsule and sends the capsule to the moon. The boy grows up on 
the moon in total isolation and with no exposure to any human language. 
Call the boy “Notrue.”
On Hector’s account of truth, we understand a belief to be true by, 
ultimately, judging it to be going on in the same way as precedent true be-
liefs. Imagine Notrue trying to form his first true belief. Maybe he is, say, 
3 years old, sees the Earth outside his moon-colony window, and forms 
the belief that we would inscribe using “That is pretty.” Now imagine 
Notrue at age nine trying to understand that belief to be true. According 
to Hector, Notrue needs to judge it to go on in the same way as precedent 
true beliefs. But Notrue thinks there are no precedent beliefs because he 
thinks he is the only sentient being there has ever been. On Hector’s ac-
count, Notrue can never understand any of his beliefs to be true because 
he cannot judge any of them to go on in the same way as precedent true 
beliefs because he does not believe there are any precedent true beliefs. 
And that seems plainly false. Notrue certainly will have the belief, by 
age fifteen, say, that we would inscribe using “Sometimes I get hungry.” 
There is no reason (aside from Hector’s account of truth) to think that by 
age fifteen Notrue could not understand that it is true that sometimes he 
gets hungry.
This defect is not an artifact of a science fiction story. Unless we say 
that God has always had infinitely many beliefs of which there is no first 
precedent, none of us can understand the truth of any of our beliefs. To 
do so in the absence of that infinite with-no-lower-bound series of God’s 
beliefs, some person would have initially had to come to understand 
a first true belief.11 To do so she would have had to have judged that that 
first true belief, first, goes on in the same way as precedent true beliefs. 
But first has no precedents. So she could not come to understand its truth. 
Only by positing an infinite series of precedent true beliefs had by God 
of which there is no first member can Hector’s account of understanding 
the truth of a belief get off the ground. This is quite a hefty theological 
condition on an account of understanding true belief that is supposed to 
be perfectly general.
11Suppose a million people tried to do so simultaneously. Simultaneous first true beliefs 
also lack true precedents. They only have true contemporaries.
